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The Federal Principle and the 2005
Balance of Powers in Canada
Eugénie Brouillet*

I. INTRODUCTION
In 1998, the Supreme Court of Canada stated that federalism is a
principle “inherent in the structure of our constitutional arrangements,
which has from the beginning been the lodestar by which the courts
have been guided”.1 In doing so, it was simply confirming what is
apparent from the spirit and the wording of the Constitution Act, 1867.2
During the pre-Confederation period, various designs were presented
concerning the type of regime that would most likely cater adequately to
the cluster of wishes and interests of the existing colonies. The group of
framers at the origin of the regime finally chose the federal principle as
the foundation of the new constitution.3 In this regard, the Preamble to
the constitutional text unequivocally asserts: “the Provinces … have
expressed their Desire to be federally united …”.4 As for the wording of
the regime, it provides for nothing less than the establishment of a
federation in all of its legal aspects; that is to say, essentially, that it
creates a distribution of legislative powers between two levels of

*

Professor, Faculty of Law, Université Laval.
Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, at para. 56, [1998] 2 S.C.R.
217, at 251 [hereinafter “Secession Reference”].
2
(U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5.
3
John A. Macdonald himself, after stating his preference for a unitary state, was obliged
to reaffirm the federal nature of the proposed regime and thus defend the provinces’ sovereign
character during the Quebec Conference of October 1864: “New Zealand’s constitution was a
Legislative Union, ours Federal. . . . . In order to guard these [local charters], they [the constituent
assembly for New Zealand] gave the powers stated to the Local Legislatures, but the General
Government had the power to sweep these away. That is just what we do not want. Lower Canada
and the Lower Provinces would not have such a thing.”: G.P. Browne, Documents on the
Confederation of British North America (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1969), at 124. The status
of New Zealand’s local entities was therefore similar to that of municipalities: their existence was
in no way guaranteed by the Constitution and stemmed from legislative provisions that could be
modified as Parliament willed.
4
Constitution Act, 1867, supra, note 2, Preamble.
1
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government that are autonomous in their respective areas of
jurisdiction.5
Yet, the highest Canadian court’s new-found eagerness for
federalism and, in general, for unwritten constitutional principles is not
necessarily echoed in its federal jurisprudence relating to the
distribution of legislative powers between both levels of government,
although that is precisely the core of the federal principle. Indeed, this
“lodestar” that is federalism has only explicitly guided the Supreme
Court, in its legal reasoning, in a relatively exceptional fashion6 and,
above all, in a manner that reveals an absence of federal theory.
As an unwritten or implicit constitutional principle, federalism may
serve as a guide for the courts in interpreting and applying the
provisions of the constitutional text, and thereafter, in closing any gaps
if there are any to be found.7 Yet, despite the significant importance that
the Supreme Court of Canada seems to give to the federal principle in
some decisions, notably in the Secession Reference, it has not resorted

5

K.C. Wheare, Federal Government, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964).
The autonomy of the provincial legislatures in matters under their exclusive jurisdiction was
fundamentally not undermined by the existence of the Governor General’s powers of reservation
and disallowance, notably because of the principle of responsible government. For an in-depth
analysis of the spirit and the letter of the original federal regime, see Eugénie Brouillet, La négation
de la nation. L’identité culturelle québécoise et le fédéralisme canadien (Sillery: Éditions du
Septentrion, 2005), at 105-98 [Brouillet, La négation de la nation].
6
Since the abolition of appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the
Supreme Court of Canada has referred to federalism by name in approximately 30 decisions. This,
of course, does not include the decisions where the principle (or one of its synonyms, such as
“federal principle” or an equivalent) was found in the cited doctrine or those where the Court
simply referred to it in order to assert that it is not relevant for resolving the litigation: Tremblay v.
Daigle, [1989] S.C.J. No. 79, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 530; British Columbia (Milk Board) v. Grisnich,
[1995] S.C.J. No. 35, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 895 ; Eugénie Brouillet, “La dilution du principe fédératif et
la jurisprudence de la Cour suprême du Canada” (2004) 45 C. de D. 7-67 [Brouillet, “La dilution du
principe fédératif”].
7
Secession Reference, supra, note 1. See also Warren J Newman, “Réflexions sur la
portée véritable des principes constitutionnels dans l’interprétation et l’application de la
Constitution du Canada” (2001-2002) 13 N.J.C.L. 117; Jean Leclair, “Canada’s Unfathomable
Unwritten Constitutional Principles” (2002) 27 Queen’s L.J. 389; Robin Elliot, “References,
Structural Argumentation and the Organizing Principles of Canada’s Constitution” (2001) 80 Can.
Bar Rev. 67; Sujit Choudhry, “Unwritten Constitutionalism in Canada: Where Do things Stand?”,
(2001) 35 Can. Bus. L.J. 113; Sujit Choudhry, and Robert Howse, “Constitutional Theory and the
Quebec Secession Reference” (2000) 13 Can. J.L. & Jur. 143; Patrick Monahan, “The Public Policy
Role of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Secession Reference” (1999-2000) 11 N.J.C.L. 65;
Dale Gibson, “Constitutional Vibes: Reflections on the Secession Reference and the Unwritten
Constitution” (1999-2000) 11 N.J.C.L. 49; W.H. Hurlburt, “Fairy Tales and Living Trees:
Observations on Some Recent Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada” (1998) 26
Man. L.J. 181.
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to this principle primarily as a guide for interpreting the express
provisions of the Constitution, particularly those pertaining to the
distribution of legislative powers. Rather, the Court has resorted to it in
order to fill in the gaps and account for whatever seems to be implicit.8
The distribution of legislative powers constitutes, however, the very
heart of the federal principle.9
The purpose of this article is to attempt to discern, in the light of
some of the 2005 cases,10 the Supreme Court’s conception of the federal
balance between the powers of the two levels of government and of its
role relating to its preservation. Our analysis will reveal an absence of a
federal theory that prevents the High Court from establishing and

8

In Secession Reference, supra, note 1, Canada’s highest court states that federalism is a
principle underlying the written Constitution and that it constitutes “a central organizational theme
of our Constitution” (para. 57). It is this principle, together with the principle of democracy, which
brought the Court to establish, in the hypothesis of a clear expression by Quebecers of the desire to
achieve the secession of Quebec, a constitutional obligation to reciprocally negotiate constitutional
modifications in order to meet this demand by the population of Quebec. In the Patriation
Reference, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753, the Supreme Court of Canada established the federal principle as
the raison d’être of a constitutional convention requiring the federal government, wishing to
unilaterally operate the patriation and heavy modifications to the Canadian Constitution, to obtain
prior consent from a good number of provinces. The Court thus considered that the participation of
both levels of government in the process of modifying the Constitution is an essential corollary of
the federal principle.
9
Brouillet, “La dilution du principe fédératif”, supra, note 6.
10
This article analyzes the 2005 decisions on the distribution of powers relating to matters
that may have a significant impact on the federal balance of powers, namely the general principles
of interpretation, the general trade and commerce power, the trenching power and the federal
paramountcy doctrine. Therefore, I will not review the cases where the Supreme Court has simply
interpreted well-established principles, as the pith and substance doctrine and its corollary, the
incidental effects doctrine. In Fédération des producteurs de volaille du Québec v. Pelland, [2005]
S.C.J. No. 19, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 292 and British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., [2005]
S.C.J. No. 50, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 473, the Supreme Court confirmed the power of the provinces to
incidentally affect extraprovincial interests when legislating on matters falling within their field of
legislative competence. In D.I.M.S. Construction inc. (Trustee of) v. Quebec (Attorney General),
[2005] S.C.J. No. 52, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 564, the Court concluded that the provincial dispositions did
not subvert the scheme of distribution under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985,
c. B-3 (the “BIA”), because they granted no more rights than are permitted under the BIA.
Consequently, there were no conflicts between the federal and provincial legislation, therefore no
basis for the application of the federal paramountcy doctrine. In UL Canada Inc. v. Quebec
(Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 11, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 143, the Supreme Court orally confirmed
a judgment of the Quebec Court of Appeal concluding that provincial provision respecting the
colour of margarine was within the limits of the provinces’ legislative authority over local trade.
Finally, in Castillo v. Castillo, [2005] S.C.J. No. 68, 2005 SCC 83, the majority of the judges found
unnecessary to determine whether the provincial impugned provision (which determines the time
limits within which the Alberta courts can entertain actions), including live actions arising in a
foreign jurisdiction and governed by the substantive law of that foreign jurisdiction, exceeds the
territorial limits on provincial legislative jurisdiction.
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maintaining a sound federal balance in the Canadian context. This lack
of a federal theory can be illustrated by reviewing the general principles
of interpretation used by the Court in the Employment Insurance Act
Reference,11 the application of the trenching power and the general trade
and commerce power in the Kirkbi12 case, plus the criteria developed by
the Court relating to the federal paramountcy doctrine in the Rothmans13
decision.

II. SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT THE FEDERAL PRINCIPLE
The essence of the federal principle resides in the union of groups for
certain common goals, groups that otherwise maintain their distinctive
existence for other purposes. Consequently, the adoption of a federal
regime will be appropriate when the implicated entities wish to be
united under a single independent government for certain subject
matters of a common interest, and meanwhile still maintain or establish
independent governments for subject matters that correspond to their
distinctive interests. Moreover, amongst the factors that weigh in favour
of a separation between communities, the presence of a different culture
within given communities is that which, above all, exercises the most
pressure in favour of the adoption of a federal rather than a legislative
union. In other words, the diversity that is expressed within entities
desiring to unite themselves into a federation is often a cultural one. In
this regard the Canadian federation is no exception.14
Federalism results from the encounter of dual intentions, those of
maintaining both unity and diversity through a continuous process of
adaptation. It is a type of arrangement of the state power that aims to
achieve a balance between the individual impulsions and the collective
tendencies of the implicated groups. Federalism therefore alters between
two poles, that of complete centralization, which translates into the
creation or the preservation of a unitary state, and that of complete
decentralization, which leads to the creation or the preservation of more
than one state.

11
Reference re Employment Insurance Act (Can.), ss. 22 and 23, [2005] S.C.J. No. 57,
[2005] 2 S.C.R. 669 [hereinafter “Employment Insurance Act Reference”].
12
Kirkbi AG v. Ritvik Holdings Inc., [2005] S.C.J. No. 66, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 302.
13
Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc. v. Saskatchewan, [2005] S.C.J. No. 1, [2005] 1 S.C.R.
188.
14
Brouillet, La négation de la nation, supra, note 5, at 105-150.
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By definition any balance is unstable, thus federalism must be
understood as a process, as a model that is evolving and in perpetual
adaptation rather than as a static system regulated by immutable rules.15
The suppleness offered by this principle of state organization allows one
to imagine a full spectrum of legal arrangements that can be more or
less centralized or decentralized16 in order for the federal structure to
correspond to the social, political, historical and cultural realities of a
community.
Despite the extensive plurality of federal systems worldwide, it is
still important to define the essential legal characteristics of federations.
As a legal principle, federalism essentially implies a distribution of
legislative powers between different levels of government that are
autonomous or independent of one another in exclusive legislative
matters. This autonomy must be guaranteed in a supreme written
Constitution, whose interpretation and application must be vested in the
hands of a judicial neutral umpire. In matters of disputes concerning the
distribution of powers, the judicial umpire must attempt, when adapting
the constitutional text to new realities, to maintain a balance between the
powers of the different levels of government.
Dictionaries define the notion of “balance” as follows: “a condition
in which different elements are equal or in the correct proportion”.17
Undoubtedly, the perception of the existence or the absence of balance
in a given case will be partially influenced by the outlook of the person
called to establish or preserve it. In this sense, the concept of balance is
subjective. However, in federal matters, the fact remains nonetheless
that the actual survival of federalism commands the delicate exercise of
properly harmonizing the opposing forces that it involves. The search
for a federal balance aims at keeping an equilibrium between the values
of unity and diversity, whose first legal expression is laid down in the
distribution of powers between the levels of government. The value of
unity will be essentially preserved if the autonomy of the central
government is protected, as the value of diversity will be maintained if
15
Carl J. Friedrich, Tendances du fédéralisme en théorie et en pratique (London:
Frederick A. Prueger Publishers, 1971), at 185.
16
Different institutional indications enable one to situate a federal regime on the scale of
lesser or greater centralization of power, notably the federated entities’ external power, concurrent
powers, residual power and each level of government’s financial autonomy. See Brouillet, La
négation de la nation, supra, note 5, at 86-94.
17
Concise Oxford Dictionary, 10th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), at
101.
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the federated units are free from interference from the central
government in the exercise of their exclusive legislative powers.
The Courts have recognized the federal nature of the Canadian
Constitution on multiple occasions. The Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council, the appellate court of last resort for Canadian affairs until
1949, affirmed this on numerous occasions, notably in the following
passage which has since become classic:
The object of the Act was neither to weld the provinces into one, nor
to subordinate provincial governments to a central authority, but to
create a federal government in which they should all be represented,
entrusted with the exclusive administration of affairs in which they
had a common interest, each province retaining its independence and
autonomy.18

An analysis of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council’s
jurisprudence reveals that the federal principle guided it in the
interpretation and the application of the rules relating to the distribution
of legislative powers. The Judicial Committee prided itself in reiterating
this and making it the source of every legal postulate essential to its
survival and to its proper functioning, in particular, the autonomy of
provincial legislatures in those matters reserved for their exclusive
legislative jurisdiction. While carrying out the task of adapting the
constitutional text to the evolution of Canadian society, the Judicial
Committee favoured a literal interpretation attentive to the balance
between provincial and federal legislative powers.19 In doing so, the

18
Maritime Bank of Canada (Liquidators of) v. New Brunswick (Receiver-General),
[1892] J.C.J. No. 1, [1892] A.C. 437, at 441 and 442. From the first years of the federation, the
Judicial Committee stated that one of the basic premises to the federal character of the Constitution
is the provinces’ autonomy in their areas of jurisdiction: Citizens Insurance Co. of Canada v.
Parsons, [1881] J.C.J. No. 1, [1881-82] 7 A.C. 96, at 108; Hodge v. The Queen, [1883-84] 9 A.C.
117, at 132. See, also to the same effect, Ontario (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General),
[1896] A.C. 348, at 360 and 361; In re the Initiative and Referendum Act, [1919] A.C. 935, at 942;
British Coal Corp. v. The King, [1935] A.C. 500, at 518; Canada (Attorney General) v. Ontario
(Attorney General), [1937] A.C. 326, at 366 and 367; Shannon v. Lower Mainland Dairy Products
Board, [1938] A.C. 708, at 722.
19
In order to do so, the Judicial Committee largely based itself on a correlative
interpretation of s. 92(13) on the one hand, and of s. 91(2) and the “peace, order and good
government” clause, on the other hand. It also inspired itself with the federal principle and its
underlying notion of balance in order to distribute the legislative powers between both levels of
government so as to incorporate the contents of international treaties into internal law, according to
the subject matter of said agreements (Canada (Attorney General) v. Ontario (Attorney General),
supra, note 18). For an in-depth analysis, see Brouillet, La négation de la nation, supra, note 5, at
218-53.
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Judicial Committee was simply implementing the intention expressed by
the framers at the origins of the regime and formally laid out in the
Constitution’s actual text. Thus, this article’s position is that the critics
of the Judicial Committee’s jurisprudence, who rebel against its
supposedly “provincial bias”,20 are rather contesting the federal choice
knowingly made by those political figures of the 19th century.
In 1949, the abolition of appeals to the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council certified the Supreme Court of Canada as the appellate
tribunal of last resort for all matters.21 From that moment on, the Judicial
Committee’s federal interpretation, attentive to preserving a balance
between the respective powers of each level of government by
protecting their autonomy in the exercise of their jurisdiction,
progressively made way for a more and more power-centralizing
interpretation, thus engendering a federal imbalance. The Supreme
Court’s reasoning, in matters of the federal distribution of legislative
powers, is indeed animated by growing considerations of efficiency to
the detriment of diversity.22
Thus, the country’s highest Court no longer seems to give much
weight or importance to the federal principle when resolving conflicts
concerning the distribution of legislative powers. As Professor Donna
Greschner appropriately stated:
… for the most part, when the Court now addresses federalism
questions, it toils in relative obscurity. . . . In sum, consideration of

20

Vincent MacDonald, “Judicial Interpretation of the Canadian Constitution”, (1935-36) 1
U.T.L.J. 260 [MacDonald, “Judicial Interpretation of the Canadian Constitution”]; “The
Constitution in a Changing World” (1948) 26 Can. Bar Rev. 21; W.P.M. Kennedy, “The British
North America Act: Past and Future” (1937) 15 Can. Bar Rev. 393; “The Interpretation of the
British North America Act” (1944) 8 Cambridge L.J. 146; F.R. Scott, “The Consequences of the
Privy Council Decisions” (1937) 15 Can. Bar Rev. 485; “Centralization and Decentralization in
Canadian Federalism” (1951) 29 Can. Bar Rev. 1095; William F. O’Connor, Report to the Senate
on the British North America Act (Ottawa: Queen’s Press, 1961); Raphael Tuck, “Canada and the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council” (1941-42), 4 U.T.L.J. 33.
21
An Act to Amend the Supreme Court Act, S.C. 1949, c. 37.
22
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence is indeed more and more animated by a functionalist
logic of the distribution of legislative powers, for example, relating to the national concern doctrine,
the general trade and commerce power and the federal trenching power. Brouillet, La négation de
la nation, supra, note 5, at 319-22; Jean Leclair, “The Supreme Court of Canada’s Understanding
of Federalism: Efficiency at the Expense of Diversity” (2003) 28 Queen’s L.J. 411; Ghislain Otis,
“La justice constitutionnelle au Canada à l’approche de l’an 2000: uniformisation ou construction
plurielle du droit?” (1995-96) 27 Ottawa L.R. 261; Henri Brun, “L’évolution récente de quelques
principes généraux régissant le partage des compétences entre le fédéral et les provinces” in
Congrès annuel du Barreau du Québec (1992) (Quebec: Service de la formation du Barreau du
Québec, 1992).

314

Supreme Court Law Review

(2006), 34 S.C.L.R. (2d)

federalism questions has diminished as a daily and definitional part of
the Supreme Court’s obligations and its self-identity.23

The year 2005 was plentiful insofar as federal jurisprudence is
concerned. Indeed, the Supreme Court rendered no less than eight
decisions, moreover all unanimous,24 regarding in whole or in part the
rules relating to the distribution of legislative powers. An attempt will
be made to detect, in light of some of these decisions, the highest
Canadian Court’s conception of Canadian federalism.

III. THE PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION:
HEGEMONY OF THE EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH
All interpretative activity involves a certain amount of creation by the
interpreter. Judges therefore benefit from a discretionary margin when
determining the meaning of legal rules. This discretion takes on
considerable proportions in constitutional matters. First, constitutional
texts contain general terms that leave the way open for a plurality of
plausible meanings. Next, constitutional texts seldom provide precise
rules in order to resolve particular cases; this prompts the judges to
make up for the silent or spare wording of the Constitution. This is what
Professor Vilaysoun Loungnarath calls the vagueness and the
insufficiency of the constitutional texts, characteristics that “create a
space inside of which the judicial decision is no longer objectivised by
legal reasoning or by the wording of the constitutional provision. When
the judge advances into this space, inevitably some of his political
values penetrate and affect the law”.25
The Judicial Committee’s application of the statutory rules of
interpretation to the provisions of the Constitution Act, 1867 gave rise,
23

Donna Greschner, “The Supreme Court, Federalism and Metaphors of Moderation”
(2000) 79 Can. Bar Rev. 47, at 58.
24
Except for the decision rendered in Castillo v. Castillo, supra, note 10, where
Bastarache J. drafted separate reasons, although concurring as to the outcome.
25
Vilaysoun Loungnarath, “Le rôle du pouvoir judiciaire dans la structuration politicojuridique de la fédération canadienne” (1997) 57 R. du B. 1003, at 1006 and 1007 (translated by
author). See also Henri Brun & Guy Tremblay, Droit constitutionnel, 4th ed (Cowansville, Qc.:
Yvon Blais, 2002), at 189; Andrée Laloie, Pierrette Mulazzi & Michèle Gamache, “Les idées
politiques au Québec et le droit constitutionnel canadien” in Ivan Bernier & Andrée Lajoie, eds., La
Cour suprême du Canada comme agent de changement politique (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press in co-operation with the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development
Prospects for Canada, 1986), at 1-110, in which the authors emphasize that the constitutional
jurisprudence is influenced by the current political ideas.
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particularly from the 1930s onward, to numerous criticisms by Canadian
authors who considered that it was preventing the constitutional text
from adapting itself to the latest economic and social conditions of
Canadian society.26 It was not so much the Judicial Committee’s socalled incapacity to adapt the constitutional text that frustrated them, but
more the direction in which it was doing so; that is to say, an adaptation
attentive to the balance between provincial and federal legislative
powers. For them, the latest conditions demanded that powers be
centralized in the hands of federal authorities.27
Since the 1970s, the Supreme Court has progressively distanced
itself from the literal interpretation approach in favour of an adaptive or
dynamic approach to interpretation. In so doing, the Supreme Court has
authorized itself to resolve the inadequacy that can exist between the
constitutional text and the social conditions that it is meant to govern.
Thus, judges are summoned to decide which constitutional requirements
are most advantageous by considering their political consequences. The
embedding of a charter of rights and freedoms into the Canadian
Constitution in 1982 largely contributed to inspiring a wave of activism
in constitutional jurisprudence.28 This is not about denying that any
constitutional text inherently requires adaptation, but rather about
underlining the need for some bounds29 when accomplishing such a task,
without which those who hold judicial power will appear to be
encroaching on the framer’s power. Yet, one of those bounds in matters
of adapting the distribution of legislative powers to the latest
26

W.P.M. Kennedy, Some Aspects of the Theories and Working of Constitutional Law
(London–Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1932), at 92 and 93; Vincent C. MacDonald, “Judicial
Interpretation of the Canadian Constitution”, supra, note 20, at 282: “… prevailing political
theories which indicate the propriety or necessity of a greater degree of national control over, and
governmental intervention in matters of social welfare and business activity”. See also, to the same
effect, Bora Laskin, “Peace, Order and Good Government — Re-examined” (1947) 25 Can. Bar
Rev. 1054, at 1085.
27
Alan C. Cairns, “The Judicial Committee and Its Critics” (1971) 4 Canadian Journal of
Political Science, at 339.
28
Henri Brun & Guy Tremblay, supra, note 25, at 770-74; Jacques Frémont, “La face
cachée de l’évolution contemporaine du fédéralisme canadien” in G.-A. Beaudoin, J.E. Magnet, et
al., Le fédéralisme de demain: réformes essentielles (Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur, 1998) 45, at 56.
29
The interpretation process’ inherent discretion was exercised by the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council with the help of three main guidelines: the statutory rules of interpretation, the
rule of stare decisis and the federal principle. As for the Supreme Court of Canada, it greatly freed
itself from the literal interpretation approach privileged by the Judicial Committee in favour of a
progressive interpretation approach, and it also largely diluted the application of the rule of stare
decisis and of the federal principle: Brouillet, La négation de la nation, supra, note 5, at 201-18 and
255-66.
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circumstances is the framers of 1867’s intention to create a federation in
Canada, along with everything that such a choice legally entails, notably
respect for each level of government’s autonomy in the exercise of their
exclusive legislative powers.
The Supreme Court of Canada has long favoured a progressive
interpretation of Canadian constitutional texts, notably of the distribution
of powers between the federal Parliament and provincial legislatures. In
1976, in Reference re: Anti-Inflation Act (Canada),30 the Supreme Court
affirmed the necessity of considering “that a Constitution designed to
serve this country in years ahead ought to be regarded as a resilient
instrument capable of adaptation to changing circumstances”.31 In 1984,
in the Skapinker decision, the Court explicitly stated that the Canadian
Charter must receive a progressive and realistic interpretation.32 The same
year, in the Southam decision, it reiterated its commitment to an adaptive
interpretation of the Constitution, this time as a whole.33
In the Ontario Hydro decision rendered in 1993, the Supreme Court
explicitly recognized the complementary nature of its role with respect
to political forces when it resolves litigation relating to the distribution
of legislative jurisdictions:
This is not to say that the courts do not have an important, indeed
essential, role in balancing federalism as they go about their task of
defining the nature and effect of those great but more subtle powers,
not susceptible of definition and direction by those elemental political
forces that undergird Canadian federalism [contrary to constitutional
conventions]”.34

Paradoxically, in this decision, the Court affirmed that the federal
Parliament’s declaratory power35 should not be interpreted restrictively
30
31
32
33

[1976] 2 S.C.R. 373.
Supra, note 30, at 412.
Law Society of Upper Canada v. Skapinker, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 357, at 366.
Canada (Combines Investigation Acts, Director of Investigation and Research) v.
Southam, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at 155. In this decision, the Court referred to the analogy between
the Canadian Constitution and a living tree imagined by Lord Sankey in Edwards v. Canada
(Attorney General), [1930] A.C. 124, at 134. See, also to the same effect, Beauregard v. Canada,
[1986] S.C.J. No. 50, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 56, at 81.
34
Ontario Hydro v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board), [1993] S.C.J. No. 99, [1993] 3
S.C.R. 327, at 373 [hereinafter “Ontario Hydro”].
35
The federal Parliament’s declaratory power allows it to declare that a work normally
under the legislative power of the province where it is located is henceforth for the general
advantage of Canada or for the advantage of two or more provinces, and therefore comes under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal Parliament: Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3,
reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5, s. 92(10)(c).
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in order to be in conformity with the corollaries of the federal
principle.36
It is interesting to emphasize the rhetorical function of the various
approaches to or principles of interpretation. Indeed the latter represent
guides, tools that are used by judges to justify and legitimate their
decisions. The judge has entire discretion to choose one or another
interpretation approach, to which he or she will resort in order to
persuade the audience that the decision is not only reasonable, but also
justifiable in law.37
The margin of judicial discretion inherent in the constitutional
interpretation process therefore appears, at least since the 1970s, to have
significantly increased along with the Supreme Court’s choice in favour
of a large and progressive interpretation of the constitutional provisions.
In a federal regime that contains a national minority community, the
problem that arises is that of the audience. If the large and progressive
interpretation requires that societal values and expectations be
considered, it surely refers to the dominant values and expectations:
those of the majority.38 Yet, the weakening of the federal principle, as a
normative principle, responds to the expectations and values that are
dominant in Canadian society — at least amongst its elite — in favour
of the centralization of powers. The desire for centralization is
intimately linked to the strong sentiment of belonging, towards the
central government, that Anglo-Canadians generally keep alive. For
them, it is the government level that should enjoy as many powers as
possible in order to achieve national goals. Regarding this sense of
identity, Professor Philip Resnick expressed himself as follows:
In a more general sense, . . . the English Canadian sense of nation has
itself been very much a by-product of the creation of the central
government in 1867, the year of Canada’s Confederation. The sense of
36
Ontario Hydro, supra, note 34, at 370-73. Chief Justice Lamer, in a concurring opinion,
despite his statement that the general and declaratory powers of the federal Parliament must be
interpreted in a way that ensures a federal balance between both levels of government, nonetheless
equally judges that the Federal Parliament’s jurisdiction extends not only to the works and to the
enterprises exploiting these originally provincial works, but also to the integrated activities that are
related to them: id. The dissent of Sopinka, Cory and Iacobucci JJ. should be noted.
37
Chaïm Perelman, “La motivation des décisions de justice, essai de synthèse”, in Chaïm
Perelman & Paul Foriers, La motivation des décisions de justice (Brussels: Bruylant, 1978), at 412;
Pierre-André Côté, Interprétation des lois, 3d ed. (Montreal: Thémis, 1999), at 25 and 26.
38
Andrée Lajoie, “Garantir l’intégration des valeurs minoritaires dans le droit : une
entreprise irréalisable par la voie structurelle”, in Jean-François Gaudreault-Desbiens & Fabien
Gélinas, eds., The States and Moods of Federalism (Cowansville, Qc.: Yvon Blais, 2005), at 365.
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identity and citizenship for most English-speaking Canadians has been
caught up with that level of government. Though regionalist sentiment
has not been lacking, especially in the Atlantic provinces or in western
Canada, the vast majority of English-speaking Canadians define
themselves as Canadians first.39

In 2005, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to reiterate its
preference for the principle of progressive interpretation during
litigation relating to the distribution of legislative powers. In the
Employment Insurance Act Reference,40 the Court had to decide whether
provisions of the federal employment insurance statute relating to
maternity and parental benefits were ultra vires of the Parliament.
After the determination of the provision’s pith and substance (to
replace the employment income of insured women whose earnings are
interrupted when they are pregnant),41 the Court had to identify the head
of power to which the pith and substance relates. It then applied the
principle of progressive interpretation in finding the scope of federal
power to legislate in matters of unemployment insurance. In doing so,
the Court rejected the originalist approach privileged by the Quebec
Court of Appeal, and consequently has attributed very little weight to
evidence relating to the intent of the framers of the 1940 amendment
that transferred power over unemployment insurance from the
provincial legislatures to the federal Parliament.
The Quebec Court of Appeal had concluded that evidence shows
that the amendment of 1940 was aimed at enabling federal authorities to
set up a plan to insure individuals against lost income following the loss
of their job for economic reasons, not following the interruption of their
employment for personal reasons.42 It was the opinion of the Court of
Appeal that the principle of progressive interpretation may not be
applied if it would disregard the intent of the 1940 amendment:
In the circumstances, I do not believe that the image of a living tree
capable of growth can be used to contend that social evolution in
Canada would henceforward have rendered the provisions of the

39
Philip Resnick, “The Crisis of Multi-National Federations: Post-Charlottetown
Reflections” (1994) 2 Rev. Const. Stud. 189, at 191.
40
Reference re Employment Insurance Act (Can.), ss. 22 and 23, [2005] S.C.J. No. 57,
[2005] 2 S.C.R. 669 [hereinafter “Employment Insurance Act Reference”].
41
Id., at para. 34.
42
Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] Q.J. No. 277, [2004]
R.J.Q. 399, at para. 72 (C.A.).
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Employment Insurance Act pertaining to pregnancy and parental
benefits constitutionally valid, whereas the provisions would have
been considered invalid had they been incorporated into the
Unemployment Insurance Act, 1940.43

Rather, the Supreme Court held that the essence of the federal
jurisdiction over unemployment insurance is “the establishment of a
public insurance program the purpose of which is to preserve workers’
economic security and ensure their re-entry into the labour market by
paying income replacement benefits in the event of an interruption of
employment”,44 regardless of the reasons for the interruption. Therefore,
the Court found the federal provisions valid.
The effect of this decision was to extend the scope of federal power
over social matters that the provinces had specifically refused to transfer
to the federal Parliament in 1940.45 This broad interpretation of federal
power necessarily causes a correlative reduction of the scope of
provincial powers over property and civil rights in the province.
Moreover, after assessing that the adaptation of the Constitution must be
“consistent with the limits resulting from the constitutional division of
powers”, the Court stated that
where a specific power has been detached from a more general power,
the specific power cannot be evaluated in relation to the general
power, because any evolution would then be regarded as an
encroachment. Rather, it is necessary to consider the essential
elements of the power and to ascertain whether the impugned measure
is consistent with the natural evolution of that power.46

This statement of the Supreme Court could mean that in adapting
the constitutional text, it is no longer necessary to interpret heads of
powers each in relation to one another (process of mutual
modification47). In this context, only specific powers could be given a
progressive interpretation to the detriment of general power. Many
federal heads of power are specific ones detached from the general
provincial power over property and civil rights in the province. This

43

Id., at para. 92.
Employment Insurance Act Reference, supra, note 40, at para. 68.
45
Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General), supra, note 42.
46
Employment Insurance Act Reference, supra, note 40, at para. 44.
47
Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, vol. 1, looseleaf (Toronto: Carswell,
1997), at 15-35.
44
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ruling of the Court may thus have negative effects on the federal
balance.
In the same decision, the Supreme Court expressly dismissed any
responsibility in maintaining a federal balance when adapting the
original federal settlement. For the Court,
[t]o derive the evolution of constitutional powers from the structure of
Canada is delicate, as what that structure is will often depend on a
given court’s view of what federalism is. What are regarded as the
characteristic features of federalism may vary from one judge to
another, and will be based on political rather than legal notions. The
task of maintaining the balance between federal and provincial powers
falls primarily to governments.48

This statement illustrates the absence of a federal theory in the
jurisprudence of the highest court of the land. First, for the Court,
federalism is a political concept devoid of normative content. Second,
the Court considers that it has no leading role to play in maintaining a
balance between the powers of the two levels of government. The
problem with the Court’s conception is that it does in fact play a major
role in relation to the preservation or non-preservation of such a
balance.49 In 1867, the federal principle had been chosen instead of a
legislative union precisely to insert into the Constitution legal
guarantees for the autonomy of the provinces. Political power struggles
cannot on their own constitute a real safeguard for minorities,
particularly for national minorities: they need the power of law. This is
one of the underlying reasons for choosing the federal principle.
The need to adapt constitutional texts to new realities is undeniable.
The real questions are rather which evolutionary path must be privileged
and how the courts can keep a federal balance when performing their
task as umpires of the distribution of powers.

IV. THE TRENCHING POWER AND THE GENERAL TRADE AND
COMMERCE POWER
The distribution of subject-matter jurisdictions, though perhaps drafted
with some precision, is not so clear when the time comes for its practical

48

Employment Insurance Act Reference, supra, note 40, at para. 10.
Furthermore, in 1993 the Supreme Court expressly recognized its role to this effect in
the Ontario Hydro decision, supra, note 34, at 373.
49
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application. The complexity of social life inherently involves some
overlapping between the different jurisdictions of each level of
government. The Courts have indeed recognized that both the federal
Parliament and provincial legislatures can validly affect, in an incidental
manner, the other government’s jurisdiction when making legislation
that is in relation to their own jurisdiction.50 As long as the impact
produced upon the other level of government’s jurisdiction is only an
incidental side effect, the sole criterion of “pith and substance” will
suffice. However, what will happen when the encroachment is blatant,
in other words, more meaningful or substantial?
This situation will arise when a provision is, in pith and substance,
invalid, but its constitutional validity is nonetheless maintained because
it forms part of a legislative whole that is otherwise valid. This is known
as the trenching power.
For a century, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and later
the Supreme Court, developed and applied a criterion of necessity: the
federal Parliament51 was required to demonstrate that its legislative
intervention in a matter of exclusive provincial jurisdiction was “truly
necessary” or “integral” to the federal scheme. Traditional case law
would only tolerate an encroachment on provincial jurisdiction by the
federal Parliament to the extent that it could demonstrate a necessity.52
However, in 1978 the Supreme Court enunciated and applied a new
50
This is known as the ancillary or necessarily incidental power. See in particular General
Motors of Canada Ltd. v. City National Leasing Ltd., [1989] S.C.J. No. 28, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 641, at
670 [hereinafter “General Motors”]; Quebec (Attorney General) v. Kellogg’s Co. of Canada,
[1978] 2 S.C.R. 211.
51
In cases where such an encroachment is a result of the application of provincial laws,
the latter will rather be declared inapplicable to the persons or things under federal jurisdiction: Bell
Canada v. Québec (Commission de Santé et de la sécurité du travail du Québec), [1988] S.C.J. No.
41, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 749. The Supreme Court’s statements in Global Securities Corp. v. British
Columbia (Securities Commission), [2000] S.C.J. No. 5, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 494, at para. 19 and
Kitkatla Band v. British Columbia (Minister of Small Business, Tourism and Culture), [2002] S.C.J.
No. 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 146, at para. 58, according to which said power to encroach could also play
in favour of the provinces are based on a passage from Dickson J. in General Motors where the
latter was referring to the provinces’ ancillary powers: General Motors, supra, note 50, at 670.
Moreover, the Court did not apply this power to encroach: in Global Securities, the provincial
provision involved was valid; in Kitkatla Band, it was rather a concern relating to the applicability
of a provincial provision toward Indians.
52
Ontario (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General), [1894] A.C. 189, at 201;
Tennant v. Union Bank of Canada, [1894] A.C. 31; Montreal (City) v. Montreal Street Railway,
[1912] A.C. 333; R. v. Thomas Fuller Construction, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 695, at 713; R. v. Fowler,
[1980] 2 S.C.R. 213; Peel (Regional Municipality) v. MacKenzie, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 9. In those three
Supreme Court decisions, the application of the criteria of necessity prompted the Court to
invalidate the federal encroachments on provincial jurisdiction.

322

Supreme Court Law Review

(2006), 34 S.C.L.R. (2d)

requirement, the “functional relationship” test.53 This requirement is
much less demanding of the federal Parliament than the criterion of
necessity, since it allows an encroachment on provincial jurisdiction for
the sole purpose of facilitating or rendering the exercise of federal
jurisdiction more convenient.54
The few hesitations of the Supreme Court regarding the criterion to
be applied in matters of the trenching power came to an end, so to
speak, in 1989 with the General Motors decision. In this case, the Court
declared valid section 31.1 of the Combines Investigation Act,55 a
provision that created a civil right of action before the Federal Court.
After concluding that the provision encroached, though in a limited
fashion, on provincial jurisdiction in relation to property and civil rights,
the Court had to determine whether the disposition formed part of a
valid legislative regime. The Court then applied the five hallmarks56 of a
valid federal intervention under the general branch of the trade and
commerce clause and concluded that the Combines Investigation Act is
valid under section 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867. 57
Since section 31.1 was inserted in a valid federal act, the Court was
left to determine the level of integration required for its constitutional
validity. For the Court, the choice of which criterion to apply (necessity or
functional relationship) will depend on the extent of the encroachment on
provincial jurisdiction. If the encroachment is minimal, a “functional

53

R. v. Zelensky, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 940 [hereinafter “Zelensky”]. Here the three Quebec
justices’ dissent should be noted.
54
Henri Brun, “L’évolution récente de quelques principes généraux régissant le partage
des compétences entre le fédéral et les provinces” in Congrès annuel du Barreau du Québec (1992)
(Quebec: Service de la formation du Barreau du Québec, 1992), at 25. The application of the
functional criteria in the Zelensky decision prompted the Court to validate a provision of the
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34 that authorized the criminal trial judge to condemn the convict
to indemnify the victim, obviously a matter within provincial jurisdiction in relation to property and
civil rights pursuant to s. 92(13) of the Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted
in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5.
55
R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23.
56
The first three criteria were stated by Chief Justice Laskin in MacDonald v. Vapor
Canada Ltd., [1977] 2 S.C.R. 134, at 158 and following. Justice Dickson added two more in
Canada (Attorney General) v. Canadian National Transportation Ltd., [1983] 2 S.C.R. 206, at 267:
(1) the contested legislative measure must be inserted in a general system of regulations; (2) the
system must be constantly under the surveillance of a governing body; (3) the legislative measure
must concern commerce in general, rather than a particular sector; (4) the law should be of such a
nature that the Constitution would not habilitate the provinces to adopt it, whether jointly or
separately; and (5) omitting to include a single or several provinces or localities in the legislative
system would compromise its application in other parts of the country.
57
Supra, note 54.
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relationship” with the law will suffice to preserve its validity. But in the
case of a considerable encroachment, a stricter criterion is applicable: the
provision must be “truly necessary” to the federal scheme.58
In the General Motors case, the Court’s position being that the
encroachment on provincial jurisdiction was limited, it applied the
“functional relationship” test and concluded that such a link did in fact
exist between section 31.1 and the federal legislative regime.59 Although
it is possible to criticize the development and the application of the
“functional relationship” test in this case (since the encroachment on
provincial jurisdiction in matters of property and civil rights is rather
blatant), the fact is that the provision offered a private remedy solely for
particular violations of the Act and did not create a general cause of
action of a private nature.
In 2005, the Supreme Court was driven to apply the trenching
power and the general trade and commerce power in a context bearing
several similarities to the facts of the General Motors case. In the
Kirkbi60 case, the questions were whether a provision creating a statutory
action of passing-off in the federal trademark legislation was ultra vires
Parliament and whether the federal trademarks legislation itself was a
valid exercise of the Parliament’s general trade and commerce power.
First, even if the Court did not add new hallmarks of a valid
exercise of Parliament’s general trade and commerce power to those it
already set out in General Motors in 1989, it clearly expressed for the
first time the idea underlying their application: “The ‘general trade and
commerce’ category requires an assessment of the relative importance
of an activity to the national economy as well as an inquiry into whether
an activity should be regulated by Parliament as opposed to the
provinces”.61 The evaluation of the “importance” of a matter and the
determination of what “should be” the distribution of legislative powers
are clearly questions of a political nature that should not be relevant in
judicial adjudication. One may be troubled by the fact that with these
considerations underlying the application of the general trade and
commerce power, there will be no effective limits to that head of federal

58

General Motors, supra, note 50, at 669 and 683.
Id., at 683 and 684.
60
Kirkbi AG v. Ritvik Holdings Inc., [2005] S.C.J. No. 66, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 302
[hereinafter “Kirkbi”].
61
Id., at para. 16.
59
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power. In the Kirkbi case, the Court found the federal trademarks
legislation to be valid.
Moreover, the Supreme Court reiterates the idea that the five
hallmarks developed so far are by no means exhaustive and only amount
to “indicia” that the federal Parliament must be granted an exclusive
authority to legislate in relation to a given matter under its general trade
and commerce power.62 By reserving the possibility to decide future
cases involving the general trade and commerce power on an individual
basis, the Court is simply arousing the federal government’s hope of
seeing its jurisdiction in this field increase even more.
Second, the Supreme Court found valid the provision of the Trademarks Act,63 creating a civil remedy that, in essence, codifies the common
law tort of passing-off, and therefore, is an invasion of provincial
legislative power over property and civil rights. For the Court, the degree
of relationship between the provision and the regulatory scheme that was
appropriate in that case to sustain the validity of the provision was a
“functional relationship”, instead of the requirement that it must be “truly
necessary” or “integral” to the federal scheme. The Court applied that test
because the provision “only minimally intrudes into provincial
jurisdiction over property and civil rights”.64 In fact, it is difficult to
consider a statutory codification of tort rights in federal legislation as a
minimal intrusion into the provincial power over property and civil rights.
That encroachment upon the provincial domain could have important
consequences on the federal balance of legislative power, to the detriment
of provincial legislatures. Contrary to the civil remedy integrated into the
Combines Investigation Act and declared intra vires the federal
Parliament’s general trade and commerce power in the General Motors
case, the provision of the Trade-marks Act in Kirkbi created a general
remedy and cause of action on a national basis.65
The way the Supreme Court applied the federal general trade and
commerce power and the ancillary power doctrine may thus have effects
on the federal balance of powers between the federal Parliament and
provincial legislatures.

62

Id., at para. 17.
R.S.C. 1985, c. T-13.
64
Kirkbi, supra, note 60, at para. 33.
65
For further critique of the Kirkbi decision viewed from the trenching power standpoint,
see Bruce Ryder, “The End of Umpire? Federalism and Judicial Restraint”, in this volume.
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V. THE FEDERAL PARAMOUNTCY DOCTRINE
The way the courts apply the doctrine of federal paramountcy66 can have
profound implications on the balance of powers under a federal system.
This doctrine provides that where there are inconsistent federal and
provincial laws, both valid, the former will prevail and the latter will
become inoperative. The effects produced by the provincial rule of law
will then be suspended to the extent of their incompatibility with the
federal rule of law, and this for as long as the incompatibility endures.
The impact of this doctrine on the balance of powers between the two
levels of government depends on whether the court will adopt a broad or
narrow definition of inconsistency.
The simultaneous presence of two laws, one provincial and the other
federal, dealing with the same subject is characteristic of the exercise of
concurrent jurisdictions. The Constitution Act, 1867 only provides for a
very limited number of them.67 In 1867, the exclusiveness principle
dominated the distribution of legislative jurisdiction between the two
levels of government. However, the creation of so-called exclusive
heads of power does not prevent the existence of numerous laws
overlapping one another when implementing the Constitution. Situations
of concurrency follow notably from the doctrine of ancillary powers, the
trenching power and the dual aspect theory. The main thing to retain is
the importance invested in the notion of “conflict”, particularly in this
era when there is a multiplication of overlapping laws, because the
existence of such a “conflict” entails a federal imbalance in favour of
the federal Parliament.
The sole test of inconsistency in the jurisprudence of the Supreme
Court has long been understood to be express contradiction: the
provincial law is deemed to be inoperative only if there is an
impossibility of dual compliance.
Originally, the Courts applied the principle of federal paramountcy
from the moment they noticed the simultaneous presence of a federal
law and a provincial law dealing with the same subject. They would
then presume that the federal legislator intended to handle the issue
66
Federal paramountcy is expressly provided for in regard to concurrent jurisdictions
under ss. 92A(3), 94A and 95 of the Constitution Act, 1867, supra, note 54. In the second of these
cases, it is nonetheless the provincial law that prevails. This principle of federal paramountcy has
been extended by jurisprudence to other conflicts of valid laws. For more on this, see Henri Brun &
Guy Tremblay; Droit constitutionnel, 4th ed. (Cowansville, Qc.: Yvon Blais, 2002), at 457.
67
Id.
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completely and exclusively, without inquiring about the possibility that
both laws might operate in a complementary manner. This was called
the “covering the field” (or negative implication) test.68
Over the years, the Canadian Courts did nevertheless develop and
apply a strict conflict requirement, the express contradiction test: a
provincial law and a federal law, both valid, dealing with the same
subject can operate in a concomitant fashion, unless there exists
between them such a conflict that to observe one of them entails the
violation of the other. Numerous decisions went in this direction.69
However, it is the Supreme Court’s 1982 decision rendered in the
Multiple Access70 case that serves as the leading authority in relation to
the operational conflict requirement. The question raised was that of the
compatibility between Ontario and federal legislative texts concerning
insider trading, particularly, provisions dealing with the use of
confidential information. The provincial and federal provisions were
practically identical as to their object, their content and the remedies that
were provided. Regarding the conflict requirement, the Court expressed
itself as follows: “In principle, there would seem to be no good reasons
to speak of paramountcy and preclusion except where there is actual
conflict in operation as where one enactment says ‘yes’ and the other
says ‘no’, ‘the same citizens are being told to do inconsistent things’;
compliance with one is defiance of the other”.71 By applying such a
demanding test, the Supreme Court was displaying judicial deference to
the provincial legislators by preserving the operability of their laws,
which were perfectly valid in any case. However, it is notable that in
this case the provincial and federal provisions were practically identical
as to their object, their content and the remedies that were provided for.
In a sentence that went unnoticed, so to speak, the Supreme Court

68
Brun, supra, note 54, at 26; Hogg, supra, note 47, at 16-18. Also on this entire issue of
federal paramountcy, see François Joyal, “Le principe de la primauté de la législation fédérale en
droit constitutionnel canadien” (1993) 27 R.J.T. 109.
69
Fawcett v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1964] S.C.R. 625, at 630; Ross v. Ontario
(Registrar of Motor Vehicles), [1975] 1 S.C.R. 5, at 12 and 13; Interprovincial Co-operatives Ltd.
v. Dryden Chemicals Ltd., [1976] 1 S.C.R. 477, at 515 and 516; Kozan Furniture (Yorkton) Ltd.
(Trustee of) v. Countrywide Factors Ltd., [1978] 1 S.C.R. 753, at 808; Construction Montcalm Inc.
v. Quebec (Minimum Wage Commission), [1979] 1 S.C.R. 754, at 780.
70
Multiple Access Ltd. v. McCutcheon, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 161.
71
Id., at 191. See also Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36,
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, at 963 and 964. During this period, only the Lechasseur decision handed
down by Laskin C.J. made an exception to the application of the express contradiction test: Quebec
(Attorney General) v. Lechasseur, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 253.
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already stated what would later become the determining criteria in
matters of federal paramountcy after the Rothmans72 decision rendered
by the Supreme Court in 2005, that
there is no true repugnancy in the case of merely duplicative
provisions since it does not matter which statute is applied; the
legislative purpose of Parliament will be fulfilled regardless of which
statute is invoked by a remedy-seeker; application of the provincial
law does not displace the legislative purpose of Parliament.73

In 1990, in the Hall74 decision, while the express contradiction test
was thought to be firmly established, the Supreme Court re-examined its
application. This re-examination extended the number of situations
where the rule of federal paramountcy could be applied. From that
moment on, the question of whether an incompatibility exists between
federal and provincial provisions remains however, the nature of this
incompatibility is different: from the strict operational conflict that was
targeted by the incompatibility of application, the Supreme Court from
then on considers that a conflict arises when the provincial rule of law
can potentially have the effect of displacing the legislative purpose of
Parliament. This was an important jurisprudential turnaround that
allowed a considerable extension of the number of cases where the
federal paramountcy doctrine could be applied. In this case, the Court
had to determine if a conflict existed between two provisions of the
Bank Act,75 which permitted banks to execute their securities in case of
debtors’ default, and two provisions of a Saskatchewan law76 that
obliged creditors to send prior notices to debtors before the execution of
their securities.
In the Hall case, there was no incompatibility of application
between the federal and provincial provisions, the latter simply
imposing an additional condition for the realization of securities, that is
to say a prior notice from the creditor. In other words, by sending a prior
notice to the debtor, in conformity with the provincial law, the financial
institution was not contravening the federal law (the latter being silent
as to the question of a prior notice). Nonetheless, the Court concluded
72
Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc. v. Saskatchewan, [2005] S.C.J. No. 1, [2005] 1 S.C.R.
188 [hereinafter “Rothmans”].
73
Multiple Access Ltd. v. McCutcheon, supra, note 70, at 190-91 (emphasis added).
74
Bank of Montreal v. Hall, [1990] S.C.J. No. 9, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 121 [hereinafter “Hall”].
75
R.S.C. 1985, c. B-1, ss. 178, 179.
76
The Limitation of Civil Rights Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. L-16, ss. 19, 27.
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that a “true conflict of application” exists between them.77 In substance,
it came to this conclusion because there is reason to believe that by
adopting these provisions, the federal legislator intended to prevent
provincial laws from imposing conditions on the banks for realizing
their securities without delay. From then on, the approach simply
consists of asking whether the provincial law’s application could
displace the federal Parliament’s legislative purpose. This very
subjective criteria is centralizing because it conditions the application of
federal paramountcy — and thus the inoperability of an otherwise
perfectly valid provincial law and to the mere explicit or even implicit
intention of the federal legislator to exclude the operation of otherwise
valid provincial legislative intervention.
In the Mangat78 case, a decision rendered in 2001, the Supreme
Court was called to determine if a conflict existed between, on the one
hand, section 30 and section 69(1) of the Immigration Act79 (which
allowed non-lawyers to represent clients before the Immigration and
Refugee Status Commission) and, on the other hand, section 26 of the
Legal Profession Act80 of British Columbia (which forbade any person
other than a member in good standing of the Bar from practising law).
After mentioning its jurisprudential position developed in the Hall
decision and applied in the M & D Farm case,81 to the effect that a
conflict exists when it is reasonable to conclude that the provincial law’s
operation would displace Parliament’s purpose, it concluded that the
provincial law’s provision was inoperative, although abiding by it would
not have entailed violating the federal provisions. In Mangat, according
to the Court, abiding by the provincial provision would have the effect
of displacing the legislative purpose of Parliament by adopting its
norms, that is to establish “an informal, accessible (in financial, cultural,
and linguistic terms), and expeditious process, peculiar to administrative
tribunals”.82

77

Hall, supra, note 74, at 152.
Law Society of British Columbia v. Mangat, [2001] S.C.J. No. 66, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 113
[hereinafter “Mangat”].
79
R.S.C. 1985, c. I-2, ss. 30, 69(1).
80
S.B.C. 1987, c. 25, s. 26.
81
M & D Farm Ltd. v. Manitoba Agricultural Credit Corp., [1999] S.C.J. No. 4, [1999] 2
S.C.R. 961, at paras. 41-42.
82
Mangat, supra, note 78, at 154.
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The same year, in the Spraytech83 case, the Supreme Court reiterated
the importance of the federal Parliament’s purpose when applying the
conflict requirement. It concerned an alleged conflict between, on the
one hand, the federal Pest Control Products Act84 and, on the other hand,
a municipal bylaw restricting the usage of pesticides. The Court
concluded in favour of the municipal bylaw’s operability because it felt
that: “No one is placed in an impossible situation by the legal imperative
of complying with both regulatory regimes”.85 The federal law simply
regulates which pesticides can be registered for manufacture and/or use
in Canada. The Court added that “there is, moreover, no concern in this
case that the application of By-law 270 displaces or frustrates ‘the
legislative purpose of Parliament’”.86 Once again, the notion of
Parliament’s legislative purpose constitutes the determining factor when
applying the conflict requirement.
The decision rendered by the Supreme Court in Rothmans
permanently put an end to the doubts that may still have been lingering
as to the applicable requirements in matters of conflicting federal and
provincial laws. In that case, the Supreme Court had to determine
whether there was an inconsistency between federal tobacco legislation
allowing retailers to display tobacco and tobacco-related products, and
provincial tobacco control legislation banning all advertising, display
and promotion of tobacco or tobacco-related products in any premises in
which persons under 18 years of age are permitted. The Court made
clear what was implicit in its previous decisions, and held, after a review
of its precedents on that issue, that impossibility of dual compliance is
not the sole mark of inconsistency: provincial law that displaces or
frustrates Parliament’s legislative purpose is also inconsistent for the
purposes of the doctrine of federal paramountcy. Therefore, for the
Court, impossibility of dual compliance is sufficient but not the only test
for inconsistency. The express addition of the “frustration of legislative
purpose” test may have important implications for the balance of power
in favour of the federal Parliament. Applying these two marks of
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inconsistency, the Court has surprisingly concluded,87 in this case, that
the federal paramountcy doctrine must not apply.
The express addition of the “frustration of the legislative purpose”
test calls for certain comments concerning the classic conception and the
modern conception of the distribution of powers.88 The classic
conception of the distribution of powers consists of the idea that the
powers conferred by sections 91 and 92 constitute “watertight
compartments”89 and that, as much as possible, it is necessary to avoid
any overlapping between the powers of each level of government. The
notion of exclusivity of legislative powers is the foremost
preoccupation. The correlative interpretation in the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council’s case law of provisions relating to the distribution
of powers is part of this conception. In the modern conception of the
distribution of legislative powers, the principle of exclusivity is applied
more gently by accentuating the laws’ actual character. By doing so, as
Fabien Gélinas has written, “the notion of exclusivity is drained of any
connotation relating to the water-tightness of jurisdictions and simply
means that the same subject matter cannot be found in both of the lists
drawn up in sections 91 and 92”.90 If a law contains several aspects, it is
necessary to choose the dominant aspect, which then becomes its
subject matter. If the legislature that adopted the law has jurisdiction
regarding this subject matter, the side effects that might be produced
upon subject matters that come under the jurisdiction of the other level
of government will not affect its constitutional validity. However, if the
importance of both the federal and provincial aspects is comparable, the
double aspect theory will be applied. Thus, according to the preceding
theory, the doctrine of ancillary powers and the trenching power
participate in the modern conception of the distribution of powers.
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As a general rule, the classic conception tends to favour respect for
the principle of provincial autonomy since it limits the overlapping of
laws that lead to the application of the rule of paramountcy in case of
conflict.91 Therefore, the issue is about limiting the “zones of contact”
between each level of government. Professor Jean Beetz, before being
nominated to the Supreme Court, highlighted the importance of the
classic conception of the distribution of legislative jurisdiction,
particularly as to the protection of Quebec’s cultural identity, in the
following terms:
The protection of Québec identity is foremost a legal issue rather than
a political one. . . . The purpose is one of reducing zones of contact
between an overly powerful majority and a too fragile minority in
spheres of influence deemed to be of vital importance because it was
thought to be at that time that such contact with one or another within
such zones would risk denaturing the collective identity of the
minority.92

However, there are cases where insisting upon the watertightness or
exclusive character of the distribution of powers will greatly hinder the
preservation of the provinces’ autonomy in their fields of jurisdiction.93
By recognizing the provinces’ power to legislate concurrently with the
federal Parliament on certain issues, the modern conception of the
distribution of powers, from which flows the double aspect theory, can
effectively tend to protect the balance of powers between each level of
government: from a provincial autonomy perspective, the tenure of a
subordinate space is better than no space at all.94 Furthermore, the
beneficial effects that an application of the modern conception of
the distribution of powers may have regarding the respect of provincial
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autonomy require a restrictive interpretation of the “conflict” notion,
and thus a parsimonious application of federal paramountcy.95
The changes made by the Supreme Court to the application of the
conflict requirement, by the addition of a “frustration of legislative
purpose” test, from a provincial autonomy perspective, have the effect
of annihilating for all practical purposes the beneficial effects that might
flow, in this specific case, from the application of the modern concept of
the distribution of powers, which favours the overlapping of laws. Thus
the Court is preventing the maximization of provincial powers.

VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, 2005 has not been a very reassuring year for the federal
principle and the balance of legislative powers in Canada. The Supreme
Court seems to solve disputes involving the distribution of powers
without having any vision of what federalism legally implies nor of the
main role it inevitably plays in the preservation of a balance of powers
between the two levels of government. The dynamics of centralization
that exists in Canada as in many federations96 calls for the elaboration of
a legal federal theory in the Supreme Court of Canada’s jurisprudence.
If federalism still means something to Canada, the Supreme Court
should inspire itself from the federal principle and its essential corollaries
in its task of adapting the Constitution to the evolution of Canadian
society. Thus, it would permit both levels of government to benefit from
the expansion of the spheres of state activity and preserve a balance
between their respective powers. Without promoting a return to the
“watertight compartments”, which would be a mistake in this era of
numerous and more complex state interventions, federalism will be
unable to survive in the long run if there is a total decompartmentalization
of each level of government’s legislative powers. Its basic survival
commands the preservation of a certain untouchable core for each head of
power. The creation of ever-increasing concurrent zones evidently gives a
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firm grip to the doctrine of federal paramountcy whose application risks
becoming more and more frequent since the Rothmans decision.
The “lodestar” of federalism obviously does not always shine with
much brightness in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. The image that
comes to mind when characterizing the use of the federal principle by
Canada’s highest court is more like that of a shooting star: shining in all
of its glory for an instant, but then immediately disappearing and
leaving behind only a dark sky.

